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INTRODUCTION
Introduction to the Special Issue: Extremism and Terrorism
Online—Widening the Research Base
Maura Conwaya,b and Stuart Macdonaldb
aDublin City University, Dublin, Ireland; bSwansea University, Swansea, UK
In 2017, also in a special issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, this one titled
“Terrorist Online Propaganda and Radicalization,”1 one of the coeditors of this issue,
Conway, made six suggestions for progressing research on the role of the Internet in
violent extremism and terrorism.2 These were to (1) widen the range of types of online
violent extremism and terrorism being studied beyond violent jihadis, especially the so-
called Islamic State (IS); (2) compare, not just across ideologies, but also groups, coun-
tries, languages and social media platforms; (3) deepen analyses to include interviewing
and virtual ethnographic approaches; (4) up-scale or improve our capacity to undertake
“big data” collection and analysis; (5) outreach beyond terrorism studies to become
acquainted with, in particular, the Internet Studies literature and engage in interdiscip-
linary research with, for example, computer scientists; and (6) pay more attention to
gender as a factor in online extremism and terrorism. If Conway’s call was to be
summed up in a single word, however, it is probably “widening.” In her 2017 article
she emphasizes in her first suggestion the widening of research on the role of the
Internet in extremism and terrorism beyond a narrow focus on violent jihadi online
content and interactions, especially that of IS, but in effect her additional suggestions to
compare, deepen, upscale, outreach, and pay closer attention to gender are all requests
to widen our efforts in different directions. This special issue seeks to showcase research
that widens the research base yet further, with all the articles not only implicitly or
explicitly taking up Conway’s suggestions, but also going beyond them.
The opening two articles in the collection take up the initial two suggestions in “Six
Suggestions” to “widen” and “compare.” The first article is an example of “upscaling” too,
while the second showcases the results of “outreach” to computer science colleagues.
In “Six Suggestions,” Conway calls for online extremism and terrorism researchers to
widen their analyses beyond particularly IS and points to the extreme right as
“particularly worth consideration.”3 In the first of two articles in the special issue lead-
authored by Weeda Mehran, she and colleagues compare a sample of text content
posted in UK- and U.S.-focused far-right online spaces (e.g., American Renaissance,
Daily Stormer, Rebel Media, Britain First) with that produced by jihadists, including not
just IS, but also Al Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and the Taliban. Specifically, the
article presents findings from a comparative analysis of a total of just over 7.5 million
words of online text, with just shy of 6.5 million words of the analyzed text collected
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from far-right online spaces and just over 1.1 million from violent jihadi cyberspaces,
with a view to determining the similarities and differences in far-right and violent jiha-
dis’ online linguistic patterns. The research findings shed light on the similarities and
differences in the cognitive, social, psychological, and temporal dimensions of language
used by adherents to the different ideologies. For example, both types of text display the
same level of certainty in arguments as a cognitive process, but with language depicting
social and emotional processes and religion used more often by the violent jihadi
extremists than their far-right counterparts. Violent jihadi extremists were also found to
be more likely than far-right extremists to discuss the future and promise change as
motivational incentives.
In their article, Conway et al. are plain about their desire to widen their treatment of
online violent jihadism beyond IS. The interdisciplinary team of social and computer
scientists accomplishes this by comparing IS’s 2017 and 2018 Twitter activity with the
Twitter activity of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Ahrar al-Sham (AAS) during the
same period. Their detailed comparative analysis shows how groups that share broadly
the same ideology were treated quite differently by Twitter, in terms of the levels of dis-
ruption each was subjected to, which, in turn, affected each groups’ broader online free-
dom to act. Importantly, Conway and colleagues’ work also extended beyond Twitter to
identify and analyze the nature and workings of the other online platforms (e.g., trad-
itional websites, other social media platforms, content upload sites) on which IS, HTS,
and AAS were active in 2017 and 2018. By researching and analyzing these other online
spaces and their functionalities, this work also contributes to the growing literature on
extremist and terrorist online ecologies, including how these are conceptualized and
methods for “snapshotting” them.
Absent from Conway’s 2017 article, but underlined by her in a keynote address at the
2017 Terrorism and Social Media (TASM) conference and a later blog post, was the
need for a “visual turn” among online extremism and terrorism researchers.4 In fact,
not only are still images now receiving considerably more attention in our field, as illus-
trated by Nouri et al.’s article herein and a host of other recent publications,5 but an
emergent focus on the multimodality of especially contemporary terrorist online content
is also apparent.6 Mehran et al. are explicit about this in the subtitle of their article on
Taliban videos, which emphasizes the group’s “Differential Use of Multimodal, Visual
and Sonic Forms Across Strategic Themes.” Robinson and Whittaker’s description and
discussion of text, images, symbols, and, crucially, interactive play in their article on
gaming also points in this direction.
Nouri et al.’s article describes and analyzes the changes in Britain First’s visual strat-
egy in the course of its forced 2018 migration from Facebook to Gab. The study found
notable changes in the visuals shared on Gab, a site with a largely right-wing user base,
versus those that had been shared on Facebook. In particular, the Gab images privileged
depiction of the group’s core members rather than Britons more generally—but as nar-
rowly conceived by them, especially as being overwhelmingly White—as on Facebook
and expanded “othering” practices to Islam and Muslims broadly, instead of just Islamic
extremism and extremists as in their Facebook visuals. Nouri et al. interpreted these
findings as likely resulting from the less regulated nature of Gab versus Facebook. This
research adds, furthermore, to the burgeoning literature showing that deplatforming
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works, in the sense that the number of users that follow groups, such as Britain First,
or prominent users, such as Britain First’s leaders’ Paul Golding and Jayda Fransen,
from major platforms to more obscure online spaces decline on each such move. In
fact, this greater level of intimacy may account, the authors point out, for the shift in
esthetic choice from the posting of more polished visuals on Facebook to their displayed
preference for more “everyday” or amateur images on Gab.
In contrast to Britain First,7 the Taliban’s extensive online presence has not been
widely studied to date, with their video content particularly underresearched. Mehran
et al.’s article first identifies and analyzes the predominant themes in a sample of 90
Taliban videos and then explores the multimodal aspects of a subset of 226 segments of
these. Multimodal analysis essentially investigates how meaning arises from the integra-
tion of language, image and sound, with studies adopting a multimodal approach gener-
ally investigating how different modes combine and interact to communicate meaning.
Mehran et al.’s article contributes to the broader literature on online jihadi content by
going beyond not just textual but also visual analysis, to examine how the Taliban com-
bine sonic and visual forms in their videos to convey meaning and attract audience
attention. For example, the authors found that Taliban videos depicting oppression and
suffering and those having a public relations function were more likely than other types
of videos to utilize multiple layers of media and complex camera angles.
With regard to gaming, the online harassment campaign against women in computer
gaming known as “Gamergate” had both right-wing extremist and violent misogynist
elements.8 And the gaming community and their platforms were again implicated in
right-wing extremist activity when Discord—“Free Voice and Text Chat for Gamers”9—
was shown to have been used extensively in right-wing extremists’ preparations for the
2017 Charlottesville rally and, indeed, thereafter.10 It is appropriate therefore that dis-
cussions of widening our research base should include attention to gaming, which is the
subject of Nick Robinson and Joe Whittaker’s article. Their article underlines too how
our findings can be enriched by outreach to other subfields and disciplines, one of
Conway’s original “Six Suggestions.”11 In their article, Robinson and Whittaker draw
from game studies to argue, among other things, that the extant literature on extrem-
ism, terrorism, and games/gaming overly emphasizes game content—a critique that can
also be made of online extremism and terrorism research more generally—and that
greater attention should instead be paid to interactive gameplay: “It is through the
undertaking of in-game actions that a player comes to experience a group’s values and
aims,” say the authors.12 The article thus also has an implicit multimodal focus.
Ethics was mentioned briefly by Conway in the conclusion of “Six Suggestions” as
one of “a whole host of issues” that it was not possible to address in the article.13 And,
in fact, one of the projects emerging from the TASM 2019 post-conference “sandpit”
event was the Researcher Security, Safety and Resilience (REASSURE) project, which is
concerned with a matter of practical ethics: the welfare of online extremism and terror-
ism researchers.14 Taking a different angle in their article, Adam Henschke and Alastair
Reed grapple with more macro-level issues around developing an ethical framework for
countering online extremist and terrorist propaganda. Their concern is that many of the
rapidly deployed responses to this threat (e.g., disruption, redirection, countermessag-
ing) have not been sufficiently well thought through from free speech, privacy,
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transparency, and numerous other, broadly ethics, perspectives. “[W]ithout an ethically
informed response,” say Henschke and Reed, “governments and other relevant decision
makers can fall prey to ad hoc decision making which is, in fact, biased, unfair, unjusti-
fied or simply inexplicable.”15
Like the Taliban, the online activity of Africa-based jihadi groups, including al-
Shabab and Boko Haram, remains underresearched.16 Rather than directly addressing
Boko Haram’s online activity however, in the closing article of the collection, Jacob
Zenn takes an interestingly different angle, addressing the ongoing scholarly debate
regarding Boko Haram’s 2002 2003 founding and 2009 2010 militant turn and the
use of “Internet sources” to evidence or deny aspects of these pivotal moments in the
group’s evolution. Zenn argues for the utility of both what’s sometimes termed “digital
trace data” and other times “born digital” data, in this case produced and circulated by
jihadists, and digitized data, in this case located, seized, and uploaded to the Internet by
U.S. government actors, in researching Boko Haram. While reliance on digital trace
data is at the core of online extremism and terrorism research, the diverse attitudes of
scholars largely concerned with a group’s “real world” activity to such data are note-
worthy. Controversy regarding the veracity of hard copy documents made publicly
available online (i.e., digitized sources) is also worth noting, not just in regard to local
Boko Haram researchers’ attitudes to the documents discussed in Zenn’s article, but
some researchers’ concerns surrounding such digitized data generally.17
In terms of Conway’s “Six Suggestions,” just two are not taken up in the articles
composing this special issue: her invitations to (3) deepen analyses and (6) pay more
attention to gender in online extremism and terrorism. With regard to the latter,
there is now a growing literature on female involvement in online extremist and ter-
rorist cyberspaces,18 female online radicalization,19 the depiction of women and girls
in online extremist and terrorist content,20 and female-targeted online content,21
albeit with a focus on IS tending to predominate still. Having said this, the role of
gender—qua social and cultural norms and distinctions based on sex—rather than
the role of women in online extremism and terrorism is still understudied, with
available reflections on these appearing in publications outside of those preferred by
online extremism and terrorism scholars.22 In terms of points of crossover with
articles included herein, Conway’s 2017 article pointed out that “[o]nline gender-
switching has been extensively studied in online gaming” and then enquired, “What
is the likelihood of high levels of gender-switching in, say, jihadi online spaces?”
Female “infiltration” into ostensibly “male only” jihadi online spaces remains a thor-
oughly unexplored issue23—undoubtedly due, at least in part, to the difficulty of
empirically studying it—for example, despite evidence of it being relatively common-
place.24 Of all Conway’s suggestions, it is (3) that calls for deepening of our analyses
via interviewing and virtual or digital ethnography—sometimes also called
“netnography”25—that remains the most elusive. Again, there are significant practical
impediments to utilizing these approaches, not least obtaining institutional ethical
approval for research that might require interaction with—as opposed to, say,
passive observation of—extremists and terrorists. Nonetheless, as the shorthand
descriptor “deepening” points to, both approaches could be expected to generate
more fine-grained data and analysis than is presently available regarding individual
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extremists’ and terrorists’ online content consumption, interactions, and other deci-
sion making and activity.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the seven articles composing this special issue
were selected from those delivered at Swansea University’s second biennial international
conference on Terrorism and Social Media (#TASMConf), which took place on 25–26
June 2019. Organized by Swansea University’s Cyber Threats Research Center, the con-
ference registered 236 delegates from 23 countries. In addition to academic researchers,
these delegates included representatives from a wide range of nonacademic stakeholders,
including policymakers, law enforcement, social media companies and think tanks. The
keynote speakers were VOX-Pol research fellow and author of Extremism,26 J. M.
Berger and Dr. Krisztina Huszti-Orban, senior legal adviser to the UN Special
Rapporteur on Counterterrorism and Human Rights.27 The conference concluded with
the session “In Conversation with the GIFCT [Global Internet Forum to Counter
Terrorism],”28 which featured Will McCants (Google’s Global Public Policy lead for
hate speech and terrorism), Dr. Erin Marie Saltman (Facebook’s policy manager over-
seeing counterterrorism and counterextremism efforts in Europe, the Middle East and
Africa) and Adam Hadley (founder and director of Tech Against Terrorism29). In add-
ition, a total of 74 others presented their research into extremists and terrorists’ use of
the Internet and allied issues across 25 breakout panels over the two days. The articles
included herein showcase some of that research.
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